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Excerpted
here is the section of the Administration’s budget proposal that affects company sponsored
retirement plans. The Pension Group, Inc.’s
preliminary comments are in blue
italics.
Reasons for Change
The
rules covering employer retirement plans are among
the lengthiest and most complicated sections of the
tax code and associated regulations. The extreme
complexity imposes substantial compliance, administrative, and enforcement
costs on employers, participants, and the government (and hence, taxpayers
in general). Moreover, because employer sponsorship of a retirement plan
is voluntary, the complexity discourages many employers
from offering a plan at
all. This is especially true of the small employers who together employ
about two-fifths of American workers. Complexity
is often cited as a reason the coverage
rate under an employer retirement plan has not grown above about 50 percent
overall, and has remained under 25 percent among employees of small firms.
Reducing unnecessary complexity in the employer plan area would save significant
compliance costs and would encourage additional coverage and retirement
saving.
They
are correct that complexity discourages small firms
from offering retirement
plans. On the other hand, the ability to shelter significant dollars
from immediate income taxation provides incentives
to
sponsor these plans. This proposal trims
complexity around the edges, but effectively eliminates the ability to
skew contributions in defined contribution plans
to benefit key members of a firm.
Proposal
The
proposal would consolidate those types of defined-contribution
accounts that permit employee deferrals or
employee after-tax contributions and simplify
defined-contribution plan qualification rules.
The
proposal would become effective for years beginning
after December 31, 2003.
The
effective date is unbelievably soon. The IRS and
Treasury department are in no way equipped
to respond this quickly. Note that all existing
retirement plans must be fully amended for legislation dating
back
to 1994 – the
IRS did not even start reviewing plans for this until 2000, and
plans have until September 2003 to comply with legislation enacted
nearly
9 years
ago! |
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Consolidate
401(k), SIMPLE 401(k), Thrift, 403(b), and Governmental 457 plans,
as well as SIMPLE IRAs and SARSEPs, into Employer Retirement
Savings Accounts (ERSAs), which would be available to all employers
and have simplified qualification requirements.
The concept of consolidation here is good. The alphabet-soup mix of plan types
and which types of employers may sponsor which types of plans makes no sense.
Why should the retirement plan of an employee be different just because they
work for a government, school, or private company.
ERSAs would follow the existing rules for 401(k) plans, subject to the plan qualification
simplifications described below. Thus, employees could defer wages of up to $12,000
annually (increasing to $15,000 by 2006), with employees aged 50 and older able
to defer an additional $2,000 (increasing to $5,000 by 2006). The maximum total
contribution (including employer contributions) to ERSAs would be the lesser
of 100 percent of compensation or $40,000.
Taxability
of contributions and distributions from an ERSA would be the
same as contributions and distributions from the plans that the
ERSA would be replacing. Thus, contributions could be pre-tax
deferrals or after-tax employee contributions or Roth contributions,
depending on the design of the plan. Distributions of Roth and
non-Roth after-tax employee contributions and qualified distributions
of earnings on Roth contributions would not be included in income.
All other distributions would be included in the participants’ income.
Existing 401(k)
and Thrift plans would be renamed ERSAs and could continue
to operate as before, subject to the simplification described below. Existing
SIMPLE 401(k) plans, SIMPLE IRAs, SARSEPs, 403(b) plans, and governmental
457 plans could be renamed ERSAs and be subject to ERSA rules,
or could continue
to be held separately, but if held separately could not accept any new contributions
after December 31, 2004.
Here the proposal
contradicts is stated objective of reducing complexity to encourage
plan formation. SIMPLE IRAs, which have been around only 6 years,
are a good choice for very small companies with limited ability to make
contributions.
The plans are typically set up with a fund company, the money goes into
individual IRAs, and the company makes a matching contribution.
There are no plan documents
to prepare, no 5500 forms to file, and no discrimination testing. Most
small employers who currently have SIMPLE IRAs will not adopt
new ERSAs, they will
simply eliminate their SIMPLEs.
ERSA Nondiscrimination
Testing. The following single test would apply for satisfying
the nondiscrimination requirements with respect to contributions
for ERSAs:
the average contribution percentage of HCEs could not exceed 200% of
NHCEs’ percentage
if the NHCEs’ average contribution percentage were 6% or less. In cases
in which the NHCEs’ average contribution percentage exceeded 6%, the
goal of increasing contributions among NHCEs would be deemed satisfied, and
no nondiscrimination testing would apply. For this purpose, “contribution
percentage” would be calculated for each employee as the sum of all employee
and employer contributions divided by the employee’s compensation.
The ACP and ADP tests would be repealed. Plans sponsored by state and
local governments
would not be subject to this test. A plan sponsored by a section 501(c)(3)
organization would not be subject to this nondiscrimination test (unless
the plan permits after-tax or matching contributions) but would be required
to
permit all employees of the organization to participate.
This test
is an improvement over the current ADP/ACP tests, but it still
must be performed and corrections made if the plan fails.
ERSA Safe
Harbor. The design-based safe harbor described below would be sufficient
to satisfy the nondiscrimination test for ERSAs described above.
The design of the plan must be such that all eligible NHCEs are
eligible to receive fully vested employer contributions (including
matching or non-elective contributions, but not including employee
elective deferrals or after-tax contributions) of at least 3
percent of compensation. To the extent that the employer contributions
of 3 percent of compensation for NHCEs are matching contributions
rather than non-elective contributions, the match formula must
be one of two qualifying formulas. The first formula would be
a 50 percent employer match for the elective contributions of
the employee up to 6 percent of the employee’s compensation.
The second would be any alternative formula such that the rate
of an employer’s matching contribution does not increase
as the rate of an employee’s elective contributions increase,
and the aggregate amount of matching contributions at such rate
of elective contribution is at least equal to the aggregate amount
of matching contributions which would be made if matching contributions
were made on the basis of the percentages described in the first
formula. In addition, the rate of matching contribution with
respect to any elective contribution of a HCE at any rate of
elective contribution cannot be greater than that with respect
to an NHCE.
The safe harbor
concept is a good one, however many employers balk at providing
a fully vested contribution. Current law already provides for such a safe
harbor plan. They have not caught on in great numbers however.
Employers want to get
some return on their contribution investment. Vesting schedules encourage
employee longevity. The longest possible vesting schedule under
current law is only
6 years.
Roth ERSAs.
The effective date for Roth contributions to ERSAs would be after
December 31, 2003 (changed from after December 31, 2005, under
current law).
Having ROTH
contributions in an employer plan just leads to complexity and
mistakes. The employer must distinguish between pre-tax ERSA
contributions and after-tax ROTH contributions. For what purpose?
Employees can establish their own ROTH accounts outside their
employer plans. We do not expect many small employers to see
a benefit in offering this in their plans.
Simplify defined-contribution
plan qualification requirements.
Defined-contribution
plan qualification requirements would be simplified as follows:
Minimum
Coverage Requirement. The following single test would
apply: plans would be required to cover a percentage of NHCEs
that is not less than
70 percent of the share of HCEs that are covered. The existing
rules for applying
this
test would remain, but the general 70 percent test and the average benefit
test would be repealed.
The coverage
ratio is the same as under current law, and most plans already
satisfy this. However, the proposal repeals the average benefits test,
which is helpful in some cases, especially smaller employers, where the
ratio test
fails. Yes, it is somewhat complex, but it saves small employers money
that they would otherwise have to contribute for employees who have already
terminated
employment.
Top-heavy
rules. The top-heavy rules would be repealed.
This is good.
Top Heavy rules are blatantly discriminatory against small firms
and should be completely eliminated.
Permitted
disparity and cross-testing. Permitted disparity and cross-testing
would no longer be permitted.
This is a
major mistake. Permitted disparity and cross-testing permit plans
to make different rates of contribution for
different groups
of employees.
Yes, these rules are often used to provide higher contribution
rates to key employees and owners, but these higher rates
provide incentive
for
these
companies to sponsor plans. New IRS rules require in most cases
that the lower paid employees
in such plans receive a minimum contribution of 5% of pay. If
an employee receives a 5% contribution every year for 30 years
and
gets an average
7% return, this
will convert into a lifetime pension income of over 40% of pay
at retirement age 65! This is a better plan than Social
Security.
Without permitted
disparity and cross-testing, owners and other decision makers
in small firms will find they
are better off taking
advantage
of the new Lifetime
Savings Accounts and Retirement Savings Accounts, and just
eliminate their company-sponsored plan, or sponsor an ERSA.
This will
hurt the lowest paid employees the most. Consider,
under current law, an employee earning $20,000 per year would
receive
a 5% contribution,
or $1,000 per year, under a company’s cross-tested
plan. If the company eliminates that plan and has just an
ERSA, then this employee will receive
NO contribution from the company unless he contributes out
of his own pay. He will have to contribute 6% on his own
to receive a 3% contribution from
the company. The Pension Group, Inc. administers hundreds
of 401(k) plans, we can tell you from experience that very
few low paid employees can afford
to contribute out of their own pay. They live paycheck-to-paycheck,
and taking a 6% hit to their income is not possible. And
these lower-paid employees pay
very little income tax, so the tax subsidy to their contribution
is miniscule.
Definitions
of compensation and highly compensated employee. The uniform definition of compensation would be all compensation
provided
to an
employee by the employer
for purposes of income tax withholding for which the employer
is required to furnish the employee a written statement
Form W-2,
plus elective
deferrals. The definition of “highly compensated employee” would
be any employee with compensation for the prior year in
excess of the Social Security wage
base for that year. For 2003, the Social Security wage
base is $87,000. The wage base is indexed and increases
every year.
This is not
all that different than current law, where the threshold is $90,000.
In Conclusion
Under the guise of simplification, the proposal eliminates
key design elements of current profit sharing and 401(k)
plans that
provide
incentive for small
firms to provide plans to their employees. Incredibly,
the proposal makes no changes in existing defined benefit plan
law. These plans are even more
complex than
defined contribution
plans.
Furthermore, these plans are not practical for many
small companies. Defined Benefit plans
can provide the same sorts of “age-weighted” benefits
that current cross-tested plans provide, but at the
expense of flexibility. Defined benefit
plan contributions are REQUIRED, under threat of
IRS penalties of up to 100% if they are not made.
And employees
earn a benefit each year in a defined benefit
plan regardless of whether or not the company makes
any money.
For
these reasons, the plan of choice for small firms has been the
cross-tested 401(k) or profit sharing plan.
The
contributions
are
not required and
can be varied year-to-year. If the company has
a bad year it can skip the contribution
entirely without IRS penalty.
The
proposal undoes most of the incentives for small firms to provide
significant retirement benefits
to their employees.
With
the ERSA
plan the proposal
will provide retirement benefits only to those
small business employees who can
afford to save for themselves, while preserving
defined benefit pensions for large company employees.
The proposal
is opposed by the Small Business Council of America, their press
release can be
seen at http://www.benefitslink.com/cgi-bin/pr.cgi?database_id=34042.
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